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LESSONS FROM A NONDELEGATION CANON
John F. Manning*
I. INTRODUCTION: NONDELEGATION CANONS
In recent years, the idea of "nondelegation canons" has gained
currency in public law'-and for good reason. Coined by Cass Sun-
stein, 2 the phrase nicely captures the aspiration that courts can deploy
interpretive canons-various well-known federalism canons,3 norms
against retroactivity,4 presumptions against extraterritoriality, 5 and the
© 2008 John F. Manning. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Bradford
Clark, Richard Fallon, Debra Livingston, Daniel Meltzer, Henry Monaghan, Peter
Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on an earlier draft. I am
grateful to the Notre Dame Law School and to the Notre Dame Law Review for putting
together a wonderful Symposium on the relationship between separation of powers
and federalism.
1 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 331-32
(2000). The idea of nondelegation canons recurs frequently in contemporary public
law scholarship. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 1671, 1674-79 (2007) (using the nondelegation canons idea as a
frame of reference for consideringjudicial approaches to immigration cases); William
K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 831, 840 (2001) (identifying Professor Sunstein's theory of nondelegation
canons as a prominent modern justification for the canon requiring courts to inter-
pret statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitu-
tional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1189, 1214-15 (2006)
(same).
2 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 316.
3 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring a clear state-
ment of legislative intent before interpreting a statute "to alter the 'usual constitu-
tional balance between the states and the Federal Government'" (quoting Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43
(requiring a clear statement of congressional intent before inferring a waiver of sover-
eign immunity).
4 See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263-80 (1994) (requiring a
clear statement for retroactive liability); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 208-09 (1988) (same).
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like-to implement constitutional (and other) values.6 Proponents of
this approach cite three related virtues. The first is that such canons
permit effective enforcement of otherwise underenforced constitu-
tional values. Nondelegation canons thus assume that even if official
action does not squarely offend an express constitutional guarantee, it
might nonetheless intrude upon widely shared background constitu-
tional values 7-such as the decentralization of power in a federal sys-
tem, the rule of law values implicit in statutory prospectivity, or the
separation-of-powers values served by confining the presumptive terri-
torial sweep of federal lawmaking.
The second-and closely related-advantage is that the values
canons do their work not by displacing congressional decisions, but
rather by using interpretive rules of thumb to promote congressional
responsibility. Congress can displace traditional state authority,
impose retroactive liability, or project its power overseas as long as it
decides to do so explicitly. What it cannot do is duck responsibility for
such choices by delegating to agencies or courts vague or ambiguous
authority that apparently permits but does not expressly prescribe
such results. By implementing constitutional values in this way,
nondelegation canons purport to avoid the brute force of Marbury-
5 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that
the extraterritoriality canon "serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord").
6 Among his compilation of nondelegation canons, Professor Sunstein also lists
canons that promote conceptions of sovereignty (such as the canon requiring liberal
construction of statutes and treaties in favor of Native American tribes) and those that
promote generally held public policy commitments (such as the canon requiring nar-
row construction of tax exemptions). See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 322-35. As dis-
cussed below, this Essay will not focus on the derivation of the subjects protected by
these nondelegation canons, but rather on their administrability. See infra note 17
and accompanying text. Although not central to the analysis, I believe that the
canons affecting sovereignty are properly understood within the framework of consti-
tutionally inspired canons; questions of sovereignty go to the relative allocation of
authority in our system of government.
7 Professor Ernest Young, who favors such canons, sees no reason to believe that
"[t]he force of a constitutional value ... is exhausted by the set of cases in which that
value would require invalidation of a conflicting statute." Ernest A. Young, Constitu-
tional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation ofJudicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REv.
1549, 1593-94 (2000). As Professor Young notes, if one views the canon of avoidance
as a resistance norm, it makes sense that "[t]he constitutional value would be pro-
tected even in cases in which the 'right answer' to the constitutional question would
require that the statute be upheld." Id. at 1589.
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style judicial review, with all of the countermajoritarian anxiety that it
produces."
The third asserted virtue (which will be this Essay's focus) is this:
within their spheres of operation, nondelegation canons have the col-
lateral benefit of promoting congressional responsibility for lawmak-
ing without the judicial manageability problems that have dissuaded
the Court from enforcing the nondelegation doctrine directly by
invalidating statutes that confer excessive discretion upon executors.9
In particular, the Court has made it abundantly clear that the constitu-
tional structure forbids the delegation of legislative power to courts or
agencies.i0 Yet it has almost never implemented that conviction
8 Hence, even if the underlying constitutional norm is not sharply delineated,
the canons should not trigger standard countermajoritarian-dilemma concerns:
"[t] he relevant canons operate as nondelegation principles, and they are designed to
ensure that Congress decides certain contested questions on its own. If this idea is a
core structural commitment of the Constitution, there can be no problem with its
judicial enforcement." Sunstein, supra note 1, at 338.
9 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
Sup. CT. REV. 223, 238-42.
10 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) ("The fundamental
precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to Con-
gress and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity." (citation omitted));
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) ("The Constitution provides that
'[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.' From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of
Government." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1)). The Court has explained, moreover, that the Constitution vests lawmaking
authority in Congress because of that body's unique qualities. See Loving, 517 U.S. at
757-58 ("Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicamera-
lism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive
and deliberative lawmaking.").
Recently, an informative debate has developed around the basic question of
whether the nondelegation doctrine has a constitutional foundation. Compare Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1304-28 (2003) (defending the traditional con-
ception of the nondelegation doctrine), with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inter-
ring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1725-41 (2002) (invoking
various textual, structural, and historical arguments to conclude that the implementa-
tion of an organic statute constitutes permissible "execution" of the law), and Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 1331
(2003) (responding to Alexander and Prakash). Questions about the originalist pedi-
gree of the nondelegation doctrine lie beyond the scope of this Essay. Rather, I seek
here merely to examine the concerns that emanate from the Court's perception that
there is a nondelegation doctrine, but that it does lend itself to manageable judicial
review.
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through judicial review,1 even though Congress has sometimes
passed organic acts with vaporous standards that grant agencies
breathtaking discretion to set the operative details of federal law.
12
The Court has candidly attributed this reticence to anxiety about its
own competence to judge when a statute is so vague or open-ended
that it effectively transfers legislative power to an agency or court.
13
Because all statutory language is more or less open textured, the
Court acknowledges that some discretion inheres in the implementa-
tion of any statute. 14 In the absence of any judicially manageable stan-
dard for identifying how much is too much, the Court has "'almost
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissi-
ble degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law."1 5 Proponents of nondelegation canons argue that
by insisting upon a clear or explicit legislative expression where a prof-
fered agency interpretation would intrude upon a relevant constitu-
tional value, such canons achieve nondelegation goals-insisting
11 The Court has only twice invalidated statutes on nondelegation grounds. See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Pan.
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). As Cass Sunstein thus observed, it is
fair to say that "the conventional doctrine has had one good year" in our entire his-
tory. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 322.
12 See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-87 (1948) (upholding a
statute authorizing an agency to recoup "excessive profits" from war contractors); Am.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-06 (1946) (upholding a statute assigning
the Securities and Exchange Commission power to reject corporate reorganizations
that "'unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure' or 'unfairly or inequitably
distribute voting power among security holders"' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2)
(2000) (repealed 2005)); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (uphold-
ing a statute delegating authority to the Federal Communications Commission to allo-
cate broadcast licenses in conformity with the "'public interest, convenience, [and]
necessity'" (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a), 310(d) (2000)); see also, e.g., Ariz.
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932)
(emphasizing that an agency exercising delegated lawmaking authority "speaks as the
legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a statute").
13 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001).
14 See id. at 475.
15 Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Manning, supra note 9, at 241-42 (discussing the judi-
cial competence concern); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 326-28 (same). Indeed, Chief
Justice Marshall recognized that same concern in the early days of the Republic:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legis-
lature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but
the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate
and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
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upon a congressional choice-without requiring judges to decide, in
the abstract, whether the underlying statute has assigned the agency
too much discretion.
16
Although scholars have repeatedly raised concerns about the ped-
igree and derivation of some of the constitutional (and other) "val-
ues" that trigger what we now call nondelegation canons,17 less has
been said about whether such canons can, in fact, achieve the
accountability-forcing goals of the traditional nondelegation doctrine
without producing the corresponding judicial administrability
problems. The subject of this Symposium-Professor Clark's
Supremacy Clause exclusivity thesis-sharply poses the latter question
by providing an explicit constitutional source for one of the most
important nondelegation canons: the presumption against preemp-
tion.' 8 In Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, Professor
Clark argues that the text, structure, and history of the Supremacy
16 Professor Sunstein thus explains:
Courts do not ask the hard-to-manage question whether the legislature has
exceeded the permissible level of discretion, but pose instead the far more
manageable question whether the agency has been given the discretion to
decide something that (under the appropriate canon) only legislatures may
decide. In other words, courts ask a question about subject matter, not a
question about degree.
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 338.
17 For example, some believe that the current Court picks and chooses constitu-
tional values in a way that is not neutral in distributional consequences; they argue
that present canons tend to favor economic liberties and state autonomy over individ-
ual rights. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 1509, 1545-46 (1998) (book review) (arguing that the textualists on the
Supreme Court selectively apply clear statement rules); Bradford C. Mank, Textual-
ism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legisla-
tive Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 527 (1998)
("[T]extualist judges selectively prefer clear-statement rules that favor states' rights
and private economic interests, and usually narrow a statute's meaning."). Others
have argued that what we now call nondelegation canons lead to the creation of
"judge-made constitutional 'penumbra[s],'" unwisely extending the document's
reach. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 816 (1983).
18 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. The classic articulation of the pre-
sumption against preemption states:
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those [where] Congress has "leg-
islated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied," we "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress."
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (first alteration added) (citation
omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1987)).
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Clause indicate that only three specific forms of law-"the 'Constitu-
tion,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' "--can displace contrary state law.19 This
careful enumeration, he argues, cross-references the familiar lawmak-
ing procedures that the document explicitly supplies for each of the
three categories-procedures that share the common feature of build-
ing in rather obvious safeguards for the states.2 0 If, as a result, the
bicameralism and presentment requirements prescribed by Article I,
19 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1321, 1427-29 (2001) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). The Supremacy
Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20 The first set of safeguards are found in the intricate provisions for adopting
and amending "the Constitution" under Articles V and VII. See Clark, supra note 19,
at 1331. Article VII of course provides that the ratification of "this Constitution" by
nine states sufficed for its establishment as the Constitution of the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. VII. Article V of course supplies the manner of amendment. In the
commonly used method, two thirds of both Houses "shall propose Amendments to
this Constitution," and those amendments become "Part of this Constitution" when
ratified by three quarters of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Citing the Supremacy
Clause's reference to "Laws ... made in Pursuance of [this Constitution]," Professor
Clark notes that the terminology of Article I, Section 7 similarly refers to the enact-
ment of "a Law." See Clark, supra note 19, at 1332. Article I, Section 7 provides that
"[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). If the President signs the bill, it
becomes a law. See id. But "if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House
in which it shall have originated." Id. In that case, if two-thirds of each House votes
to override his or her veto, it can also "become a Law." Id. (emphasis added). "Trea-
ties" make up the final category. See Clark, supra note 19, at 1332. The Treaty Clause
provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Each such procedure thus conditions the adoption of its specified legal text on
the assent of a majority or supermajority of the Senate, a supermajority of the states,
or both. See Clark, supra note 19, at 1344-46. The Supremacy Clause's adoption
coincided exactly with the Great Compromise providing for equal state representa-
tion in the Senate-further reinforcing the premise that the forms of law specified in
the Supremacy Clause were meant to tap into processes in which the interests of the
small states received explicit and disproportionate protection. See id. at 1352-55; see
also Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 1421 (2008) (elaborating on the apparent connection between the com-
promises that gave rise to equal representation in the Senate and the adoption of the
Supremacy Clause).
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Section 7 reflect the exclusive means for adopting preemptive "Laws,"
then any congressional attempt to delegate power to preempt would
circumvent the procedural safeguards of federalism prescribed by the
Supremacy Clause. Since the Court has made clear, however, that
there is no judicially manageable standard for enforcing any resulting
nondelegation doctrine directly,21 a nondelegation canon requiring a
"clear and manifest" statutory purpose to preempt nicely and manage-
ably serves the same end.
22
Because preemption doctrine has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion in recent years, 23 and because Professor Clark's Supremacy
21 See Clark, supra note 19, at 1373-78 (discussing the Court's difficulties in artic-
ulating a judicially manageable standard for the nondelegation doctrine and favora-
bly discussing Sunstein's nondelegation canons thesis).
22 See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Clark, supra note 19, at 1429 ("By recognizing only the
'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United States as 'the supreme Law of the
Land,' the Supremacy Clause requires adherence to constitutionally prescribed law-
making procedures in order to displace state law. The presumption against preemp-
tion instructs courts to apply state law unless a federal statute reflects 'the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress' to displace such law. By requiring the statute to be
clear in this respect, the presumption ensures that Congress and the President-
rather than politically unaccountable judges-make the crucial decision to preempt
state law through constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures designed to safe-
guard federalism." (footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Rice, 331
U.S. at 230)).
23 Preemption has become the subject of a considerable flurry of scholarship.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1441, 1460-84 (2008) (arguing that the pervasiveness of vetogates in the federal
legislative process counsels against strong judicial deference to agency interpretations
on questions involving preemption of state law); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemp-
tion: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,
16-36 (2007) (arguing that given the constellation of interest groups at the national
level, a presumption against preemption is more likely to inspire Congress to address
the question of preemption expressly); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,
102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 759-79 (2004) (arguing that the administrative process does
not demonstrably protect state interests less effectively than does the legislative pro-
cess); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2008) (manuscript at 26-44, on file with author) (arguing that courts should
more self-consciously consider comparative institutional competence in determining
questions of preemption); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism,
57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 19-39), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1095327 (contending that the Court has increasingly come to use
run-of-the-mill administrative law doctrines to protect state regulatory autonomy);
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 232 (2000) (arguing that the Founders
would have understood the Supremacy Clause as adopting a non obstante clause that
negates any presumption against implied repeal and therefore does not support a
presumption against preemption); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:
An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at
44-55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084919 (arguing that courts should
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Clause thesis gives the presumption against preemption a firm
(though not unassailable) constitutional grounding,24 that nondelega-
tion canon seems to offer a particularly suitable context for posing
some questions about the judicial manageability or administrability of
such canons more generally.25 In that vein, this Essay will argue that
nondelegation canons present the same line-drawing problems as the
traditional nondelegation doctrine because they require courts to
identify when an interpretive decision is properly attributed to "a Law"
passed by Congress or to policymaking discretion exercised by an
give some, but ultimately rather limited, deference to agency determinations that
state law should be preempted).
24 In his thoughtful contribution to this Symposium, Peter Strauss raises several
objections to Clark's thesis. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1567 (2008). To name one: the Supremacy Clause makes the enumerated cate-
gories of federal law supreme, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Professor
Strauss argues that unless federal law cannot preempt state common law, the term
"Laws" as used in the foregoing clause must refer to state common law. See Strauss,
supra, at 1567-73. On this account, Professor Clark's reading requires the term
"Laws" to have one meaning in the first part of the Supremacy Clause ("Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance" of this Constitution) and a different
one in the final clause describing what is preempted. See id. at 1568-69. Professor
Clark responds that "Constitution or Laws of any State" need not refer to common law
because the states received the common law by adopting reception statutes or consti-
tutional provisions. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1685 (2008). Clark also notes that, even if "Laws of any
State" were read to encompass common law, the Clause's initial reference to "Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution could not be
read to refer to common law because (unlike statutes) such law was not understood to
be "made." See id. at 1686-87. Any attempt to resolve this or the many other interest-
ing points of difference between the two lies well beyond this Essay's scope. For pur-
poses of triggering the present inquiry into the presumption against preemption as a
nondelegation canon, it suffices to note that Professor Clark's thesis represents a sub-
stantial account of important structural, functional, and political elements of a com-
promise that yielded both the Supremacy Clause and a number of lawmaking
procedures that fit coherently with its text and apparent design. Indeed, although
not grounding the conclusion in the Supremacy Clause, others have defended the
presumption against preemption as a nondelegation canon. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 331 (describing the nondelegation effect of the presumption as "an impor-
tant requirement in light of the various safeguards against cavalier disregard of state
interests created by the system of state representation in Congress").
25 The question of 'judicial manageability" of course pervades constitutional
adjudication and carries rich and complex connotations. See generally Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1274 (2006). Here, I use judicial "manageability" or "administrability" to refer to the
Court's own account of its deep reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine
because of a felt incapacity to determine how much delegated discretion is too much.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001).
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agency or court. Since all federal statutes confer some degree of dis-
cretion upon the courts or agencies that implement them, applying a
nondelegation canon will still ultimately come down to hard-to-define
judgments about whether a statute has conferred too much policymak-
ing discretion upon the entity charged with implementing it. Perhaps
as a result of this problem, the Supreme Court is prone to articulate a
canon like the presumption against preemption as a "clear statement
rule," which more manageably assigns the full burden of ambiguity to
those who would preempt-but, in so doing, goes well beyond any
plausible traditional understanding of nondelegation. In addition, I
suggest that even when a nondelegation canon is framed as a clear
statement rule, it may be hard for judges to maintain a posture in
which they must sometimes conclude that the best answer to a statu-
tory question is, say, preemption, but the result is simply not clear
enough to warrant enforcement. Hence, judges may end up doing
something that looks a lot like everyday, boring statutory interpreta-
tion, even when putatively enforcing a nondelegation canon.
This Essay will use the presumption against preemption to raise
more general questions about the judicial administrability of nondele-
gation canons. After laying some groundwork in statutory interpreta-
tion theory, Part II elaborates on why nondelegation canons generally
present judicial administrability concerns analogous to those associ-
ated with the nondelegation doctrine. It then discusses ways in which
these administrability problems might affect thejudiciary's implemen-
tation of the presumption against preemption. Part III examines
whether nondelegation cannons can provide a judicially adminis-
trable solution to at least part of the puzzle of how to structure judicial
review of agency action when an agency wishes to preempt state law.
I. NONDELEGATION CANONS AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRABILITY
This Part asks whether a nondelegation canon presents problems
of judicial administrability similar to those that have doomed the
traditional nondelegation doctrine. My thesis is simple: a nondelega-
tion canon, by definition, seeks to ascertain whether an interpretive
decision is properly attributed to congressional choice or to what, for
convenience, I will call "executory discretion"-the policymaking dis-
cretion exercised by the entity primarily responsible for implementing
the statute. For familiar reasons, however, this will be difficult (if not
impossible) to define in a principled way. All laws leave some element
of discretion to those who put them into effect. So, at least at the
margins, almost all interpretive decisions will involve some combina-
tion of congressional choice and executory discretion. The necessary
2oo8] 1549
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line drawing by courts applying a nondelegation canon may therefore
end up feeling quite similar to the line drawing needed to give mean-
ingful effect to the traditional nondelegation doctrine.
In this Part, I first address the conceptual difficulty in identifying
a meaningful line between congressional choice and impermissible
delegation. I speculate about the coincidence of that line drawing
difficulty with certain widely understood features of the presumption
against preemption-including the Court's tendency to articulate that
canon as a clear statement rule and its difficulty implementing it in a
consistent manner.
Before turning to the specifics, however, I should note that
although Professor Sunstein takes care to limit his endorsement of
nondelegation canons to contexts involving judicial review of agency
action, 26 my analysis in this Part will adopt the simplifying assumption
of a single interpreter, such as a court that must make a preemption
determination under a statute that grants a private right of action.
Putting to one side my own sense that the concept of nondelegation
canons applies no less to judicially administered statutes,27 I adopt this
assumption because one can more easily isolate the underlying line
drawing problem without the added complication of the scope ofjudi-
cial review. In Part III, however, I do draw on the resulting analysis to
examine nondelegation canons in the judicial-review-of-agency-action
context in which Professor Sunstein developed his themes.
26 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 340.
27 Under Professor Sunstein's premises, nondelegation canons instruct reviewing
courts to use tools of construction to ensure that decisions in sensitive areas properly
reflect congressional choice rather than agency discretion. See id. at 338. Even the
most formalist ofjudges would acknowledge that when judges interpret ambiguous or
open-ended statutes, they properly exercise policymaking discretion as well. Cf
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J.
511, 515 (arguing that the traditional tools of construction used by courts frequently
involve "judicial consideration and evaluation of competing policies"). Hence, the
goals of the nondelegation canon framework would seem to apply no less when the
issue is whether a sensitive decision is more properly attributed to congressional
choice or judicial discretion. Along these lines, I note that the Court does not confine
the presumption against preemption to agency-administered statutes; that canon also
plainly applies to cases in which a judge makes the primary decision whether and to
what extent a statute preempts. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S.
332, 345 (1994) (using the presumption to analyze whether the Railroad Revitaliza-
tion and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 preempts a state property tax as applied to
railroads); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (invoking the
presumption to decide whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act preempts a state
tort action); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (applying the presumption in connection with a
determination of whether the Federal Warehouse Act preempts various state law regu-
latory requirements for the storage of grain).
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A. Interpretation, Ambiguity, and Matters of Degree
In thinking about the judicial manageability of nondelegation
canons, it is helpful to compare modem assumptions about the tradi-
tional nondelegation doctrine with those about statutory interpreta-
tion. Recall first the institutional concerns that the Court has invoked
when justifying its reluctance (or, more accurately, refusal) to enforce
the traditional nondelegation doctrine through Marbury-style judicial
review. Because "no statute can be entirely precise," it is now well-
accepted "that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy
considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to
the judges applying it.' ' 28 Accordingly, "'[a] certain degree of discre-
tion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial
action.'"29 For this reason, the Court has "'almost never felt qualified
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."' 30
The question in the standard, garden-variety nondelegation case-
how much discretion is too much-simply does not lend itself to prin-
cipled line drawing.
The same difficulty troubles the alternative of enforcing nondele-
gation principles through interpretive canons. Nondelegation canons
aim to make Congress take responsibility for a choice that cuts against
some constitutional or quasi-constitutional value-including the
choice to preempt state law, to impose retroactive liability, or to pro-
ject federal legislative authority overseas. But how does one tell
whether Congress has, in fact, expressed such a decision? Few (if any)
now believe that the task of interpretation entails recovering intrinsic
"plain meaning[s]" from within "the four corners" of a statute. 31
Modern language theory tells us instead that words have meaning
because a relevant linguistic community applies an array of shared
28 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The
idea that all enacted texts will have some degree of indeterminacy has deep roots in
our history. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *62 (noting that "in laws
all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed"); THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("All new laws, though penned with the great-
est technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are consid-
ered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."); see also H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961) (explaining why texts will inevitably have
some indeterminacy on the margins).
29 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 4775 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis omitted)).
30 Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
31 White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1903) (exemplifying the old for-
malist position).
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conventions for understanding words in context. 32 Nor can the judge
identify legislative choice by excavating unexpressed but reliably genu-
ine legislative intent on a contested question about which the text is
ambiguous. 33 While intentionalism of course still has prominent
defenders, 34 the insights of public choice theory suggest that the legis-
lative process is too complex, opaque, and path-dependent to permit
judges to reconstruct how an uncertain issue would have been
resolved if Congress had confronted it more explicitly.
35
If one accepts the resultant skepticism about intrinsic plain mean-
ing and actual legislative intent, the most plausible view of legislative
32 Even the strictest textualists embrace that view. See, e.g., Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that it is a "fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word
cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is
used"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'V 61, 64 (1993) ("Because interpretation is a social enterprise,
because words have no natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we
must consult these contexts."). The modern conception derives from LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 134-142, at 44-48 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001), which emphasizes the use of words in linguistic inter-
actions within a relevant community.
33 Elsewhere, I have extensively summarized evidence for and against this view.
SeeJohn F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395-408 (2003)
(discussing the argument for strong intentionalism); id. at 2408-19 (describing the
argument for intent skepticism).
34 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speak-
ing?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEo L. REV. 967,
974-78 (2004) (explaining the centrality of the speaker's intention to the derivation
of meaning); Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autono-
mous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1089 (1993) (same); Stanley Fish, Intention Is
All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CAR-
nozo L. REV. 1109 (2008) (same).
35 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547
(1983) (" [I]t turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate [legislators'
preferences] into a coherent collective choice. Every system of voting has flaws. The
one used by legislatures is particularly dependent on the order in which decisions are
made."); id. at 548 ("[W]hen logrolling is at work the legislative process is submerged
and courts lose the information they need to divine the body's design."); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 239, 244 (1992) (noting that the success of a piece of legislation often
depends on "idiosyncratic, structural, procedural, and strategic factors, which are at
best tenuously related to normative principles embraced by democratic theorists and
philosophers"). For a particularly thoughtful rebuttal to public choice skepticism
about the recovery of legislative intent, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of
Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994,
at 3, 24-25, which argues that floor managers and committee chairs act on behalf of
the enacting coalition when they use legislative history to express the details of legisla-
tive policy.
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supremacy suggests that interpretation amounts to the derivation of
some form of "constructive intent."3 6 Simply put, an interpreter's job
is to decode legislative instructions according to shared social and lin-
guistic conventions. As Jeremy Waldron puts it:
A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision like "No vehicle
shall be permitted to enter any state or municipal park" does so on
the assumption that-to put it crudely-what the words mean to
him is identical to what they will mean to those to whom they are
addressed (in the event that the provision is passed) .... That such
assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law
depends on language, on the shared conventions that constitute a
language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that conventions
comprise.
3 7
On that theory, even in the absence of plain meaning or actual intent,
it remains possible to attribute an interpreter's decision to legislative
choice if one assumes that legislators intend "to say what one would be
normally understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one
said it." '38 By ascribing conventional meaning to legislators, this
assumption provides an intelligible way to hold them accountable for
36 Even if one starts from a baseline of skepticism about plain meaning or actual
legislative intent, some minimal conception of legislative intent is necessary to make
sense of a system founded on legislative supremacy. As Joseph Raz has insightfully
noted, "It makes no sense to give any person or body law-making power unless it is
assumed that the law they make is the law they intended to make." Joseph Raz, Inten-
tion in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
As he explains:
[T]o assume that the law made by legislation is not the one intended by the
legislator, we must assume that he cannot predict what law he is making
when the legislature passes any piece of legislation. But if so, why does it
matter who the members of the legislature are, whether they are democrati-
cally elected or not, whether they represent different regions of the country,
or classes in the population, whether they are adults or children, sane or
insane? Since the law they will end by making does not represent their
intentions, the fact that their intentions are foolish or wise, partial or impar-
tial, self-serving or public spirited, makes no difference.
Id. at 258-59. Professor Raz explains that one can have meaningful legislative
supremacy if legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded according to pre-
vailing interpretive conventions. See id. at 268; infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
37 Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAw AND
INTERPRETATION 329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); see also Gerald C. Mac Callum,
Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 758 (1966) ("The words [a legislator] uses are
the instruments by means of which he expects or hopes to effect . . . changes [in
society]. What gives him this expectation or this hope is his belief that he can antici-
pate how others (e.g., judges and administrators) will understand these words.").
38 Raz, supra note 36, at 268.
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whatever bill they have passed, whether or not they have actually
formed an intention about its detailed application.
39
In other words, interpretive theory now rests on the premise that
interpreters filter available materials through applicable conventions
to make an approximation of how a reasonable person (viz. reasona-
ble legislator) would have understood the question in issue. 40 Inter-
preters will have an array of diverse, often conflicting evidence at their
disposal: the conventional meanings of statutory language in context,
evidence of the special connotations of technical terms of art, infer-
ences from statutory structure, relevant canons of construction (both
substantive and semantic), the mischiefs that inspired a statute, the
overall tenor of the statute, and the like.41 Although practitioners of
the main interpretive approaches that now compete for the Supreme
Court's allegiance (textualism and purposivism) would filter the evi-
dence in different ways, the important point is that most modern
interpreters try to make a best approximation of what a "reasonable
person" applying relevant social and linguistic conventions would
infer from evidence of meaning that may cut in more than one
direction.4
2
39 See id. at 267 ("Th[at] minimal intention is sufficient to preserve the essential
idea that legislators have control over the law. Legislators who have the minimal
intention know that they are, if they carry the majority, making law, and they know
how to find out what law they are making.").
40 The following discussion is based on John F. Manning, Wat Divides Textualists
from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70 (2006).
41 See id. at 79-91 (discussing tools of construction commonly used by the
Supreme Court).
42 Methodological differences among the leading approaches are not trivial in
practice, but do not affect the analysis of the difficulty of using nondelegation canons.
The main dividing line on the present Supreme Court is between textualists, who
emphasize the conventional semantic meaning of the enacted texts, and purposivists,
who emphasize the goals that Congress sought to pursue in enacting the text. See id.
at 91-108 (outlining the distinctions between the two mainstream approaches). Both
camps, however, use some version of the "reasonable person" construct to describe
the relevant interpretive task. Textualists thus look for the way "a skilled, objectively
reasonable user of words" would have understood the statutory language. Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 65 (1988); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("We are to read the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Con-
gress would have read them, and apply the meaning so determined." (citation omit-
ted)); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that an interpreter should search for "the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed along-
side the remainder of the corpus juris'). The most influential version of modem
purposivism-the legal process school developed by Professors Hart and Sacks-
[VOL. 83:41554
LESSONS FROM A NONDELEGATION CANON
If that account is correct, then the interpretive process will typi-
cally lead not to a "yes" or "no" decision about whether members of
the enacting coalition actually preferred alternative x to alternative y,
but rather to a probabilistic judgment about how strongly the arrayed
evidence cuts in a particular direction under accepted conventions ("I
think it sixty percent likely that the statute means x rather than y.").43
Sometimes the relevant evidence will point so clearly in one direction
that the interpretive calculation might almost feel automatic; in that
case, the statute is surely clear in context.44 Sometimes the relevant
evidence will make it seem that Congress left no meaningful clue
about its interpretive choice; in that case, the resultant decision would
seem to hinge very much on the interpreter's executory discretion.
45
But the hard-and, for purposes of line drawing, the most rele-
vant-cases will lie at the margins. With respect to those cases, the
important question is this: if we presume that in an ordinary case (i.e.,
one not governed by a nondelegation canon), it suffices for an inter-
preter to conclude the evidence more likely than not points to x, then
how much more certainty do we need in a case governed by a
nondelegation canon? If the answer is "none," the nondelegation
canon does no work; it is ordinary interpretation. If the answer is
"some" (as it sensibly must be) ,46 then how much additional confi-
instructs interpreters to filter the same evidence through the assumption "that the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasona-
bly." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
43 See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 527, 527-28 (1947) ("When we talk of statutory construction we have in mind
cases in which there is a fair contest between two readings, neither of which comes
without respectable title deeds. A problem in statutory construction can seriously
bother courts only when there is a contest between probabilities of meaning."); Jacob
E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 677, 694 (2007)
(discussing interpretive decisions in terms of probabilities).
44 For a good working definition of statutory clarity, see infra note 52.
45 Professor Richard Pierce provides an instructive account of the types of "mean-
ingless" regulatory standards sometimes adopted by Congress-including the "tradi-
tional empty standards," "lists of unranked decisional goals," and mutually
"contradictory standards." See RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Politi-
cal Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REv. 469, 474-78 (1985). One might also
find cases, though perhaps rare, in which the relevant evidence of meaning is essen-
tially in equipoise. See Scalia, supra note 27, at 520-21 (arguing that competing inter-
pretations are almost never in equipoise).
46 In other words, courts applying a nondelegation canon must sometimes reject
what they regard as the more likely interpretation because it does not meet the higher
threshold set by the nondelegation canon. The logical necessity for such an approach
has been nicely articulated in the context of a much-studied nondelegation canon-
the canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions, where possible.
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dence is enough? I do not know how to begin to answer that ques-
tion. My uncertainty, moreover, does not depend upon any belief
that interpreters will be unable to make meaningful judgments about
the relative strength of competing interpretations-that is, about the
probabilities of each alternative, given the available evidence.
47
Rather, the problem is the conceptual one of knowing how to describe
the degree of certainty needed to cross some imaginary line between
congressional choice and executory discretion: if most proffered inter-
pretations of statutes leave some residue of ambiguity or doubt in the
interpreter's mind, how much is too much?48 As with the questions of
degree that have dissuaded the judiciary from enforcing the tradi-
tional nondelegation doctrine, there is no satisfying answer to that
question of degree.
B. Line Drawing, Clear Statements, and Ordinary Interpretation
If the concept of a nondelegation canon does present this sort of
judicial manageability problem, it might relate to two phenomena
that characterize the presumption-against-preemption case law. First,
it may give the Court cause to articulate the presumption as a clear
statement rule, pushing the inquiry away from the margins by requir-
See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 358 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "'[t]he doctrine of constitutional doubt does not
require that the problem-avoiding construction be the preferable one,'" for that
"'would deprive the doctrine of all function"' (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 270 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Frederick Schauer, Ashwan-
der Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 89 ("[A]voidance is only important in those cases
in which the result is different from what the result would have been by application of
a judge's or court's preconstitutional views about how a statute should be
interpreted.").
47 Along these lines, Gary Lawson has argued that interpreters can make such
determinations and, in fact, do so in many contexts. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law,
86 Nw. U. L. RE-v. 859, 890-94 (1992).
48 In the context of another famous nondelegation canon-the rule of lenity-
then-Judge Scalia suggested a similar problem. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d
940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that the rule of lenity "provides little more than
atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question-almost invariably present-of
how much ambiguousness constitutes an ambiguity"); see also Antonin Scalia, Assorted
Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990) ("I
should think that the effort, with respect to any statute, should be neither liberally to
expand nor strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the meaning precisely
right. Now that may often be difficult, but I see no reason, a priori, to compound the
difficulty, and render it even more unlikely that the precise meaning will be dis-
cerned, by laying ajudicial thumb on one or the other side of the scales. And that is
particularly so when the thumb is of indeterminate weight. How 'liberal' is liberal,
and how 'strict' is strict?").
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ing clear evidence of preemptive purpose. Second, the posited man-
ageability concern corresponds with (but may or may not explain) a
widely accepted observation that the presumption-against-preemption
cases are all over the map. Although detailed examination of the pre-
sumption and its implementation lies beyond this Essay's scope, I will
begin to explore some possible links between judicial manageability
concerns and those features of the case law.
First, the Court has formally articulated the presumption against
preemption as a clear statement rule:
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those [where] Congress
has "legislated... in a field which the States have traditionally occu-
pied," we "start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
49
By moving the relevant interpretive inquiry from the margins to the
tail of the distribution, such an inquiry might provide a relatively
workable criterion for implementing the nondelegation doctrine.50 It
is true, of course, thatjudges can disagree about the question whether
a statute is clear. 51 But one can at least articulate a plausible standard
49 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citation omitted) (first alter-
ation and emphasis added) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)); see also, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963) ("The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation
of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in
the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject
matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained."); Napier v. At. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) ("The inten-
tion of Congress to exclude States from exerting their police power must be clearly
manifested."); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) ("It should never be held
that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the
police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that
result is clearly manifested.").
50 Along these lines, Professor Sunstein has equated nondelegation canons with a
requirement of statutory clarity. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 330 ("These canons
impose important constraints on administrative authority, for agencies are not per-
mitted to understand ambiguous provisions to give them authority to venture in cer-
tain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary."); see also, e.g., id. at 316
(noting that such canons provide that "federal administrative agencies may not
engage in certain activities unless and until Congress has expressly authorized them
to do so"); id. (noting that under the canon of avoidance, "Congress must clearly
assert its desire to venture into the disputed terrain"); id. at 332 (noting that a civil
statute will be applied retroactively only if Congress has made "that choice explic-
itly"); id. (noting that the rule of lenity requires the imposition of criminal sanctions
to reflect "a clear judgment on Congress's part").
51 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543-46
(2007) (Breyer, J.) (finding the term "percentile" ambiguous because the statute did
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against which to argue about clarity: if all or almost all of those conver-
sant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would agree
upon a statute's meaning, the outcome can be said to be clear in con-
text.52 In such a case, where almost all interpreters (sharing a com-
mon methodology) would agree that the evidence points decisively in
one direction, only the most dedicated rule skeptics would hesitate to
attribute the resultant interpretation to Congress.53 In short, if the
very idea of a nondelegation canon requires a standard higher than
ordinary interpretation, then a clear statement may be the only mean-
ingful stopping point.
Assuming that one can successfully implement such a clear state-
ment rule for preemption, the resulting regime would effectively
assign the whole burden of statutory uncertainty to those who would
preempt. That is, even if one could plausibly ascribe preemption to
congressional choice with a lower probability interpretation, line-
drawing problems at that level might require the Court to overcorrect,
demanding a clarity of expression or purpose about which reasonable
people would not disagree. Whatever its merits, such a standard goes
well beyond the premises one might ascribe to a nondelegation canon.
No version of the traditional nondelegation doctrine has ever presup-
posed that an impermissible delegation of lawmaking power occurs
not specify the distribution against which the percentile was to be measured); id. at
1552-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the statute to be clear); Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596-97 (2004) (Souter,J.) (holding that discrimina-
tion "because of... age" is ambiguous and may mean either disfavored because of a
difference in age or disfavored because of more advanced age); id. at 603-04
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the phrase is clear in context and takes on the
"primary meaning" of difference in age).
52 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 187 (1986) (arguing that a
statute is clear when "all or most persons, having the linguistic and cultural compe-
tence assumed by the authors of the text, would agree on its meaning").
53 For some prominent versions of rule skepticism, see, for example, James Boyle,
The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
685, 708-11, 728 (1985) (contending that the linguistic formulations of legal rules
are indeterminate and that "content enters law ... not through the pure linguistic
connections envisaged by formalist theory but through the limitations imposed by a
deeply political set of assumptions about the social world"); Joseph William Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 19, 21 (1984)
(explaining that rules "generally do not determine the scope of their own applica-
tion" and discussing various external factors that influence legal doctrine); Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HAyv. L. REv. 781, 822-23 (1983) (arguing that a direction "to follow the rules tells
us nothing of substance" and that the socialization of judges is more important in
determining judicial outcomes).
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unless the statute addresses a point so clearly that reasonable people
would not disagree about its meaning.54 Indeed, if such clarity were
required for constitutionally legitimate legislation, the resultant stan-
dard would prove impossibly difficult to meet, given the starting pre-
mise that some degree of ambiguity, and thus policymaking
discretion, is inevitable in any statute. So understood, a clear state-
ment rule would operate not as a (situation-specific) stand-in for the
traditional nondelegation doctrine, but rather as a fairly prohibitive
tax upon the legislative process-one that would take the form of
incremental bargaining and drafting costs necessarily expended to
move from the level of determinacy necessary for (valid) ordinary leg-
islation to the unusual clarity demanded for legislation governed by a
clear statement rule. 55 However attractive the nondelegation canon
rhetoric may be, the justification for a clear statement rule must
reflect the additional burden upon the legislative process that the
requirement of a clear statement imposes.
A second phenomenon deserves mention: even a clear statement
regime may ultimately slide from requiring a genuinely clear state-
ment to something much more like boring, everyday interpretation.
Here is why: a clear statement rule asks judges to do something they
may find difficult. If all statutes have a latent ambiguity until inter-
preted, the judge applying the clear statement rule must apply all of
the traditional tools of construction to see if the statute adopts the
relevant disfavored result (such as preemption) in a clear and mani-
fest way. If, having interpreted the statute, the judge concludes that
the best reading favors preemption, it may be psychologically difficult
not to conflate the best reading with a clear reading.5
6
54 Of the traditional nondelegation doctrine, Professor Sunstein writes that "it is
extremely difficult to defend the idea that courts should understand Article I, section
1 of the Constitution to require Congress to legislate with particularity." Sunstein,
supra note 1, at 317. In the particular areas in which the Court applies nondelegation
canons, however, the effect of a clear statement rule, successfully applied, would seem
to require particularity-an explicit statement that Congress meant to disturb the par-
ticular value protected by the canon.
55 Framing any legal rule incurs
the cost of obtaining and analyzing information about the rule's probable
impact, and the cost of securing agreement among the participants in
the . . . process. These costs usually rise with increases in a rule's trans-
parency since objective regulatory line-drawing increases the risk of miss-
pecification and sharpens the focus of value conflicts.
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983).
56 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 43, at 697-98 (arguing that this sort of
"second-order interpretation" may be "psychologically demanding forjudges"). In a
famous article, then-Judge Breyer predicted that the Chevron doctrine would be unsta-
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Although this point obviously requires conjecture, 57 this potential
difficulty does fit with a phenomenon that many commentators have
observed about the presumption against preemption (and about some
other clear statement rules). In particular, it has become accepted
wisdom that courts apply the presumption against preemption only
spottily and that they often find preemption even in the absence of a
clear statement. 58 Indeed, others have convincingly shown that pre-
emption decisions frequently mimic the boring, garden-variety
approaches to statutory interpretation that would govern in the
absence of a clear statement rule.59 One could certainly imagine a
ble because of its similar analytical structure. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 373-81 (1986). At step one, a court
reviewing an agency interpretation of an organic act was to use the traditional tools of
construction to determine if "Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the precise question
in issue." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984). If not, the court was to accept the agency's "reasonable" interpretation even
if the court would not have arrived at the same conclusion itself. Id. at 843 n.11,845.
As then-Judge Breyer explained:
[S]uch a formula asks judges to develop a cast of mind that often is psycho-
logically difficult to maintain. It is difficult, after having examined a legal
question in depth with the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both
that the agency's interpretation is legally wrong, and that its interpretation is
reasonable. More often one concludes that there is a "better" view of the
statute for example, and that the "better" view is "correct," and the alterna-
tive view is "erroneous."
Breyer, supra, at 379. For a more detailed discussion of Chevron and its implications,
see infra Part III.
57 As noted, Professor Lawson believes that judges successfully apply differential
burdens of persuasion to statutory interpretation questions in many diverse contexts.
See Lawson, supra note 47, at 869-70, 891-96.
58 See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 (1991) (describing the Court's devotion to this presumption as
"fickle"); Calvin Massey, "Joltin 'Joe Has Left and Gone Away ": The Vanishing Presumption
Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759, 764 (2003) ("[T]he Court ... continues to
simultaneously repeat and ignore the presumption against preemption."); Merrill,
supra note 23 (manuscript at 21) (noting that "the presumption against preemption is
honored as much in the breach as in the observance"); Nelson, supra note 23, at 298
("The Court itself has applied the presumption only half-heartedly."); Sharkey, supra
note 23 (manuscript at 110) ("I join a veritable chorus of scholars pointing out the
Court's haphazard application of the presumption. In the realm of products liability
preemption, the presumption does yeoman's work in some cases, while going AWOL
altogether in others." (footnotes omitted)).
59 Along these lines, Professor Merrill has identified a number of cases in which
the Court found preemption without invoking the presumption against preemption,
even though the dissent argued that the presumption should resolve the case the
other way. See Merrill, supra note 23 (manuscript at 21) (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v.
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
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variety of potential explanations for this phenomenon-including the
possibility that the Supreme Court generally has trouble sticking to a
single interpretive approach 60 or, indeed, that multimember courts
cannot be expected to act more consistently than any other multi-
member decisionmaker. 61 But it is not far-fetched to imagine that
when asked to apply a dice-loading canon, judges can at least some-
times convince themselves that the most likely outcome is also a clear
outcome. If so, then perhaps even a clear statement rule may func-
tion in practice more like everyday statutory interpretation.
62
533 U.S. 525 (2001); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)).
My colleague Daniel Meltzer, moreover, has suggested that the Supreme Court
employs creative, purpose-oriented methods of interpretation more frequently in pre-
emption cases than in run-of-the-mill cases not governed by such a presumption. See
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court'sJudicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 343, 362-68
(analyzing the interpretive method used in a series of Supreme Court preemption
cases).
60 See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 4 (1998) ("When the Justices divide over interpretive methodology, they
usually do so along a fault line between textualists and purposivists."); cf W. Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("In recent years
the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of statutory
interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legisla-
tive history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation.").
61 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv.
802, 823-31 (1982) (using social choice theory to examine aggregation problems on
multimember courts); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court,
96 YALE L.J. 82, 102-16 (1986) (same); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not
an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 549,
554-64 (2005) (suggesting considerations that would cast doubt on the judiciary's
capacity to achieve sustained coordination on interpretive issues).
62 Although a full examination of the Court's dice-loading canons lies beyond
this Essay's scope, it is worth noting that others have identified the same judicial drift
toward inconsistent application and ordinary statutory interpretation in the context
of two other famous clear-statement approaches-the rule of lenity and the Chevron
doctrine. The rule of lenity, which stretches to the earliest days of the Republic, of
course provides that "penal laws are to be construed strictly." United States v. Wilt-
berger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see also, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (noting that the rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous
criminal statute [s] ... be construed in favor of the accused"); Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (emphasizing that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim-
inal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"). From early on, this maxim has
had a nondelegation component. See, e.g., Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95
(grounding the maxim, in part, "on the plain principle that the power of punishment
is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department"); see also United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (emphasizing that "legislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity"). As with the presumption against preemption, however, it is
well accepted that the courts apply the rule of lenity inconsistently. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 346 ("Judicial
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When one focuses on a single interpreter applying a nondelega-
tion canon, it is surpassingly difficult to say how much ambiguity is too
much to justify treating the decision as Congress' rather than the
interpreter's. This difficulty may push the Court toward articulating
nondelegation canons as clear statement rules. Even though such
rules go beyond the minimum requirement for any plausible nondele-
gation principle, they should work, at least in theory, because they
enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic .... ); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Lan-
guage, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 58 (1998) ("Although widely accepted,
the rule [of lenity] is by no means adhered to universally."). Some believe that the
maxim does no work in practice. SeeJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and
the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 199-200 (1985) ("[T]he construc-
tion of penal statutes no longer seems guided by any distinct policy of interpretation;
it is essentially ad hoc.").
Similarly, the Chevron doctrine functions like a prodelegation canon but calls for
the same line drawing. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). As discussed below, Chevron hinges on the judicial ability to
draw a line between decisions expressly made by Congress and decisions resting on
agency discretion derived from an ambiguous organic act. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 66-72. Although full consideration of the practical success or failure of that
framework is beyond this Essay's scope, it is worth noting that some commentators
have found that the Court has effectively gutted Chevron by applying the tools of statu-
tory interpretation aggressively to find congressional clarity even when the relevant evi-
dence does not point clearly in one direction. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administra-
tive State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 754-62 (1995) (arguing that the Court is too quick
to find that Congress has clearly addressed an issue that should, in fact, be viewed as
sufficiently ambiguous to trigger Chevron deference); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating
the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 429, 444-47 (same). Empiri-
cal studies have fallen on both sides of the question whether Chevron has affected
judicial behavior. Compare, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1059 (argu-
ing that in its early years, Chevron had a significant effect on the behavior of the courts
of appeals), with Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 474-75
(1996) ("Our tests show that the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial defer-
ence, but rather does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy
outcomes more to the Court's liking."), and Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359 (1994) ("The most general
finding of the survey [of Supreme Court cases preceding and postdating Chevron] was
that Chevron had not made a dramatic difference in the frequency with which the
Supreme Court deferred to agency interpretations of statutes."), and ThomasJ. Miles
& Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chev-
ron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 826 (2006) (finding it "unclear" whether Chevron affects
whatever the Justices' baseline tendency is to vote along the lines of their policy pre-
dispositions in statutory cases).
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assign the full burden of uncertainty to those who would intrude upon
the value protected by a particular canon. Judges, however, may tend
to bridle at such a requirement; whether consciously or not, they may
find it easy to confuse what they think is the most likely reading of a
statute with a clear reading of a statute. If so, then clear statement
rules-and the nondelegation principles they (over)enforce-may
end up deteriorating into something that looks more like ordinary
interpretation. If so, perhaps nondelegation canons are more trouble
than they are worth. 63
Even if one accepts these concerns, however, Professor Sunstein's
insight about nondelegation canons-which he carefully confines to
the context of agency-administered statutes64-still offers an elegant
answer to a question that has become pressing in administrative law:
whether Chevron deference should be available in a case in which the
63 Of course, instead of calibrating degrees of ambiguity, one might try to imple-
ment nondelegation canons by eliminating particular elements of interpretation that
facilitate interpreter discretion. At least sometimes, for example, the Supreme Court
seems to rule out the use of legislative history to identify a clear statement. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 597 (1992); see also, e.g., Dellmuth v.
Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) ("Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a
judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment."); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."). One
might ask whether such cases offer the potential for an alterative, and more judicially
manageable, form of nondelegation canon.
To be sure, some believe that a tool such as legislative history enhances an inter-
preter's discretion by permitting judges "to look out over the heads of the crowd and
pick out [their] friends." Scalia, supra note 42, at 36 (attributing the quip to Judge
Harold Leventhal). Others believe that legislative history confers no more discretion
than other interpretive techniques-and may confer less. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra
note 17, at 1547 (arguing that sources of textual meaning may give interpreters no
less discretion than legislative history); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 836 (1991) (argu-
ing that reliance on legislative history may actually confine the open texture of statu-
tory language). I have elsewhere suggested that some uses of legislative history do
present nondelegation problems. SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 697 (1997) (making such an argument about the use
of legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative intent). If, however, one
takes seriously the nondelegation argument for excluding such tools of construction,
the rationale does not seem easy to confine to the sphere of discrete nondelegation
canons. Exploring that complex question is not necessary to address the simpler
claim I advance here: holding one's method of interpretation constant, it entails arbi-
trary line drawing to identify the level of background ambiguity at which statutory
outcomes cross the line from congressional choice to executory discretion.
64 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 340.
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agency interprets its organic act to preempt state law.65 If one takes
the guiding rationale of Sunstein's nondelegation canons seriously,
the Court should find it straightforward to forgo the Chevron frame-
work in the sensitive contexts governed by such canons. If so,
nondelegation canons would, at the very least, serve an important sort-
ing function under present administrative law doctrine-a function,
moreover, that is judicially administrable (up to a point).
Here is why: Chevron is a prodelegation canon.66 Within its speci-
fied domain,67 Chevron presupposes that when Congress has spoken
unambiguously, a reviewing court-and the agency itself-must
respect Congress' clearly expressed instructions.68 If, however, the
organic act is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,"
the reviewing court must accept the agency's interpretation as long as
it is "permissible" or "reasonable. ' 69 This two-step analysis is the flip-
side of a nondelegation canon. If an ambiguous organic act leaves
open a question of policymaking discretion, 70 it is preferable in our
representative system to assume that Congress intended to delegate
that discretion to more accountable agencies rather than to less
accountable courts.
7 1
65 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 23, at 755-58 (arguing that if agencies pay
sufficient attention to the interest of states, federalism interests may not require
courts to forebear from giving Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutes
that result in preemption); Merrill, supra note 23 (manuscript at 65) (contending that
Chevron deference should apply only "where Congress has expressly delegated author-
ity to the agency to preempt and the agency has exercised this delegated authority");
Sharkey, supra note 23 (manuscript at 166-73) (relying on comparative institutional
competence to argue that reviewing courts should accept persuasive agency determi-
nations that national uniformity is warranted on a particular regulatory issue).
66 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 329 (describing Chevron as "the quintessential
prodelegation canon").
67 The Court has confined Chevron to an agency's implementation of delegated
authority to act with legally binding effect. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229-31 (2001).
68 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.").
69 Id. at 843-44.
70 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988) (not-
ing that ambiguity in an organic act creates space for the agency's exercise of poli-
cymaking discretion); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990) (same).
71 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
978 (1992) ("In order to make deference a general default rule, the Court had to
come up with some universal reason why administrative interpretations should be pre-
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The resultant prodelegation canon seems vulnerable to judicial
adminstrability concerns no different from those of nondelegation
canons; although looking at the problem from opposite sides of the
line, each inquiry requires courts to identify a line between congres-
sional choice and executory discretion. 72 When juxtaposed against
each other, however, these two types of canons may offer meaningful
(though ultimately incomplete) 73  boundary-drawing potential.
Accordingly, if an agency wishes to defend a preemptive interpreta-
tion on the ground that it is entitled to Chevron deference, that agency
is (by definition) asking the reviewing court to defer to the agency's
exercise of delegated policymaking discretion. That being the case, if
the presumption against preemption is indeed properly understood as
a nondelegation canon, any agency request for Chevron deference
would itself suffice to trigger the canon, thereby precluding the
agency from effecting its preemptive goals.74 On that assumption, the
ferred to the judgments of Article III courts. Democratic theory supplied the justifica-
tion .... ."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1256 (1989) (describing Chevron as "an
effort to reconcile the administrative state with the principles of democracy"). The
Chevron Court thus explained:
Judges ... are not part of either political branch of the Government.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an
agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform itsjudgments. While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
740-41 (1996) (ascribing Chevron deference to the "presumption that Congress . . .
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discre-
tion the ambiguity allows").
72 See supra note 62.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
74 Although not precisely analogous, the courts have relied on an agency's own
request for deference as a way to establish the presence of legally decisive ambiguity
in at least one other area. A central assumption of due process is that persons must
be "free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Accordingly, legal rules must give persons of "ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [they] may
act accordingly." Id. Where an agency attempts to impose a penalty or deny a benefit
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agency would always have to defend preemption decisions on the mer-
its without the benefit of judicial deference. As Professor Sunstein
argues, in matters governed by a nondelegation canon like the pre-
sumption against preemption, Chevron deference should therefore be
a nonstarter.
75
Even though this conclusion about Chevron represents one judi-
cially administrable implication of nondelegation canons, however, it
ultimately falls short of a complete solution. The Court's refusal to
apply Chevron would require an agency to defend a preemption deci-
sion on the merits of the underlying statutory analysis. 76 Looking at
the question from the perspective of de novo review, a reviewing court
applying the presumption against preemption would still have to
determine whether the statute resolved the preemption question
clearly enough to satisfy the nondelegation impulse implicit in the
presumption. That inquiry, in turn, would require court to answer
these questions: Does the interpretation at issue reflect too much
ambiguity to attribute it to congressional choice rather than executory
discretion? And just how much is too much? As we have seen, from a
standpoint of judicial administrability, those questions may have no
good answer.
77
based on an interpretation of a regulation that it deems to be sufficiently ambiguous
to warrant deference, the agency must be able to show that it has given the disadvan-
taged party specific advance notice of that interpretation. See, e.g., Ga. Pac. Corp. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 25 F.3d 999, 1005-06 (11th Cir.
1994); Kropp Forge Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 657 F.2d 119, 123-24 (7th Cir. 1981); Dravo
Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 613 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir.
1980); Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 528
F.2d 645, 649-50 (5th Cir. 1976). In effect, the agency's assertion of entitlement to
deference is taken to be an acknowledgment of sufficient ambiguity to raise concerns
about adequate notice.
75 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 330 (arguing that, where applicable, nondelega-
tion canons negate Chevron deference).
76 At least one commentator has argued that a reviewing court should review an
agency's preemption decision under the intermediate deference framework of Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which directs judges to give an agency inter-
pretation the "weight" warranted by "the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id.
at 140; see Sharkey, supra note 23 (manuscript at 143-51). As discussed above, my
sense is that if one were to take the idea of nondelegation canons seriously, the mini-
mum requirement would be that reviewing courts decline to defer to agency decisions
to preempt state law. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
77 See supra Part II.A.
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